--- title: "David Rubenstein Returns: Owning the Orioles, Private Equity's Insurance Bet, and the $40 Trillion Problem" description: Carlyle co-founder David Rubenstein on owning the Orioles, private equity's push into sports teams and insurance companies, and the $40 trillion debt. image: https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/hubfs/David%20M.%20Rubenstein_web%20thumbnail.png --- [Skip to content](https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/boyar-value-group-blog/david-rubenstein-returns#main-content) [![logo](https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/hs-fs/hubfs/Boyar_October2018%20Theme/Images/logo.png?width=110&height=70&name=logo.png "logo")](https://boyarvaluegroup.com) [![logo-inverted](https://f.hubspotusercontent10.net/hubfs/2333817/GiantFocal_Marketplace/March/logos/logo-inverted.svg "logo-inverted")](https://boyarvaluegroup.com) - Boyar Family of Companies #### Boyar Family of Companies Whether uncovering a new idea for our research subscribers, managing pension funds, or handling accounts for individual investors, our research-driven insights help both professional and individual investors pursue their investment goals.  [![Boyar\_Logo\_Asset\_Management-May-31-2023-08-39-05-3251-AM](https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/hs-fs/hubfs/Boyar_Logo_Asset_Management-May-31-2023-08-39-05-3251-AM.png?width=539&height=200&name=Boyar_Logo_Asset_Management-May-31-2023-08-39-05-3251-AM.png)](https://www.boyarassetmanagement.com/) Boyar Asset Management focuses on investing in the equity securities of intrinsically undervalued companies. 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We cover why private equity is buying into sports teams and insurance companies, the only realistic way he sees out of $40 trillion of debt, and how close the country came to nuclear war in October 1962. **Show notes:** David Rubenstein's Bloomberg interview show is a big reason I started this podcast, and he was one of my early guests, back in 2020. A lot has happened since. He bought his hometown Baltimore Orioles, and in June he was married at the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice John Roberts officiating. He's back with two new books: *Inside the Owner's Box*, his conversations with the people who own America's biggest teams, and *Speaking of America*, the best of the conversations he hosts at the Library of Congress for members of both parties. We started in Washington. I asked whether there is any way out of $40 trillion of debt. He walked through the options (raise taxes, cut spending, default, go to the IMF, appoint a commission) and why none of them will happen, then landed on the only one he thinks is realistic: "we're going to pay off the debt in devalued dollars." He explained why a 1983-style grand bargain is out of reach ("bipartisanship is seen by people on the left and the right as dealing with the enemy"), whether the Treasury should have sold 100-year bonds when rates were near zero, and whether AI can help us grow our way out. I had just read Bill Cohan's book on Apollo, so I asked about private equity firms owning insurance companies, and why Carlyle owns only a minority of its own. He gave me a candid answer. On sports, we talk about why Bob Kraft says he will never sell the Patriots, why smart investors pay up for a minority stake in a team they don't control, and why private equity firms are now buying into NFL teams. He admits he turned down a chance to invest in the Washington Commanders at a $6 billion valuation, a team he says is probably worth double that today: "I made a mistake, which I often do." He also thinks a college program like Duke basketball could one day have private owners. The second half is about *Speaking of America*: why he started bringing Republicans and Democrats together for dinner in the Great Hall, why he thinks money is the biggest reason Washington is so divided (and why he doesn't make political contributions himself), and how close we came to nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He remembers it well. His teacher told the class there would be no homework that night because "I don't think we'll be here tomorrow." We also get to Arthur Brooks on whether money buys happiness ("I know a lot of tortured billionaires"), whether the country has ever been this divided, and the one thing he says you need before you buy a sports team.   **Buy the books:** [*Inside the Owner's Box: Conversations on Power and Leadership in Sports*](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Inside-the-Owners-Box/David-M-Rubenstein/9781668022498) (Simon & Schuster, 2026) [*Speaking of America: Great Conversations at the Library of Congress*](https://www.dukeupress.edu/speaking-of-america) (Duke University Press, with the Library of Congress, 2026):   **What we cover:** - Getting married at the Supreme Court, with the Chief Justice officiating - Why he thinks we'll pay off $40 trillion of debt in cheaper dollars, and what that could mean for the dollar - Why a 1983-style grand bargain can't happen in today's Washington - Should the Treasury have sold 100-year bonds when rates were near zero? - Can AI help us grow our way out of the debt, or is AI overvalued? - Private equity's push into annuities and insurance, what a recession could do to it, and why Carlyle owns only a minority of its insurer - Bob Kraft, the Patriots, and why owners rarely sell - Why anyone buys a minority stake in a team they don't control - Why private equity is buying into NFL teams, and the Commanders deal he passed on - Could Duke basketball or Alabama football one day have private owners? - The Library of Congress dinners where Republicans and Democrats sit together, and why there's "hardly any legislation anymore" - Why money, more than primaries, drives the divide in Washington - The Cuban Missile Crisis: the Soviet submarine vote and the nuclear weapons left behind in Cuba - Has the country ever been this divided? The Civil War, the years before World War II, and Vietnam **About the guest:** David M. Rubenstein is co-founder and co-chairman of the Carlyle Group, one of the world's largest private investment firms, and chairman and CEO of the Baltimore Orioles. He is chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Gallery of Art, the University of Chicago and the Economic Club of Washington, and hosts interview programs on Bloomberg Television and PBS. An original signer of the Giving Pledge, he is known for what he calls patriotic philanthropy, including long-term loans to the government of rare copies of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence and the Emancipation Proclamation. He received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2025. His books include *How to Lead*, *The American Experiment*, *How to Invest*, *The Highest Calling*, and, this fall, *Inside the Owner's Box* and *Speaking of America*.   **Links** - [Inside the Owner's Box](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Inside-the-Owners-Box/David-M-Rubenstein/9781668022498) - [Speaking of America](https://www.dukeupress.edu/speaking-of-america%20) - [The Carlyle Group](https://www.carlyle.com/) - [David's first appearance on The World According to Boyar (2020)](https://boyarvaluegroup.buzzsprout.com/726525/episodes/6018724) - [Boyar Research on Substack](https://boyarresearch.substack.com/)   **Transcript of the Interview With David M. Rubenstein** > **\[JonathanBoyar\](0:04-1:14}** > > Important disclosures and disclaimers apply to this episode. Please listen to the end of the episode for the full disclaimer. > > Welcome to The World According to Boyar. Today I'm joined by David Rubenstein, a man who needs no introduction, so I'll keep this short. > > He co-founded the Carlyle Group, one of the leading private equity firms in the world, and he's one of the country's best-known philanthropists. He was on the show in 2020, and he's back with two new books, Inside the Owner's Box and Speaking of America. We talk about owning the Orioles, whether college teams like the Duke Blue Devils could one day have private owners, the risk of private equity owning insurance companies, and the only reaIistic way he sees out of the U.S. 's $40 trillion worth of debt. > > Here's David. > > David, welcome back to the show. > > **\[DavidRubenstein\]** > > My pleasure. Thank you for having me. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > You recently got married. Congrats. > > **\[DavidRubenstein\]** > > Thank you very much. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > And what was unique about that and what I think is really cool is it wasn't just an ordinary rabbi. It was the Chief Justice of the United States. So it's kind of a cool thing. > > **\[DavidRubenstein\](1:14-1:34}** > > Yes, I've known the Chief Justice for a while, and I asked him if he would do it, and I'm very pleased that he did. We did it at the Supreme Court with just our children there, and it was nice. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Was that the first time he's ever married someone? > > **\[DavidRubenstein\]** > > I think he may have married one other couple. I'm not sure that's his specialty, but I think he may have married one other couple. Well, he was prepared, as always, and did a great job. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (1:34 - 2:00)** > > Before I talk about both books, which I thoroughly enjoyed, I just wanted to get your thoughts on what's going on in Washington. Obviously, there's a lot there, and specifically the debt. It's $40 trillion and counting, and that's before you even include Social Security and Medicare. Interest payments on the debt are greater, I believe, than defense spending. > > Besides inflating our way out of this, is there any other way of solving the issue? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (2:00 - 3:07)** > > These are the solutions. One, you increase taxes, nobody wants to do that. Two, you cut spending, nobody seems to want to do that, and 85% of spending is defense, interest payments on the debt and entitlements. Third thing is you can just say we default, we're sorry, companies default, then we default. > > That's obviously not realistic. You could basically go to the IMF for a bailout. That's obviously not realistic either. > > You could have a commission that would come up with the authority to basically do things that the Congress doesn't want to do. We've tried that. It doesn't really work. And so, the only thing that you really can do, honestly, and which is what we're doing, is we're going to pay off the debt in devalued dollars. > > So, your children and grandchildren and my children and grandchildren, they're going to be paying off the debt in dollars that are worth less than the dollars that we borrowed. That's essentially what we're doing. And when you devalue your currency, which is essentially what we're going to do, you run the risk of not being a reserve currency, which is one of the things the United States has been able to be since World War II, the only reserve currency in the world. > > When you do that, you make your currency worth a lot less, and therefore, other reserve currencies can come along, and therefore, people will not want to buy dollars quite as much as they do now. I don't really see any other realistic solution. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (3:07 - 3:13)** > > I mean, there's no 1983 kind of Reagan-Tip O'Neill grand bargain. Is that out of the question? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (3:14 - 3:36)** > > I think you need to have leaders willing to take some political risk. I think in that 1983 situation, there was a word called bipartisanship, which was not seen as being a curse word. Today, bipartisanship is seen by people on the left and the right as dealing with the enemy. > > And as a result, you don't really get much bipartisanship, if any, at all. And so, no, I think it's a different environment than it was in 1983. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (3:36 - 4:02)** > > And speaking of bipartisanship, and we'll talk about it later, one of the things you're trying to do with your speaker series, which is part of your book, is promote bipartisanship. So maybe in your own way you can help with that. Pa rt of the problem with the debt is obviously interest rates rising, that creates more of a problem. Four or five years ago, interest rates were zero. Did we, in retrospect, make a huge mistake, not issuing 50- to 100-year bonds, or would that not have really helped much? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (4:03 - 4:38)** > > It might have helped somewhat. But remember, we have so much debt that I don't know we could have sold enough of 100-year bonds. 100-year bonds are bought by people in special circumstances. > > Not that many people are going to buy 100-year bonds. I'm not sure it would have solved the problem in my view. But obviously, when interest rates were lower, it was a better situation. > > Now, with higher interest rates, we have a problem that you've alluded to, which is that we're now paying more interest on the debt than we're spending on defense. And historically, when a country spends more on interest on its debt than it does in defense spending, it really hurts the country. And that's happened before in many countries where this has happened. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (4:38 - 4:50)** > > In your book, you interview Schmidt from Google, and he talks about how productivity is up roughly 30%, I think, over the last six years. Can we potentially grow our way out of the problem, or? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (4:50 - 5:24)** > > Well, I should have mentioned that. Yes, theoretically, you can. Right now, we have a GDP of, let's say, $32, $33 trillion. If you could grow that at 5% or 6% a year, theoretically, the revenues would be enough to deaI with some of the problem, at least a little bit of the problem. > > But growing an economy of $32, $33 trillion at more than 3% a year is very, very difficult. Obviously, nobody's ever done that. We're really growing now at maybe 2.8%, 2.9% if best case. So, growing it at 4%, 5% or 6% is really difficult for an economy of this size. That would solve the problem. But I didn't list it as a realistic solution, because I don't think it can be done. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (5:25 - 5:33)** > > Yeah, although I guess in fairness, we've never seen Al before, and it could be transformational just the way the railroads were. > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (5:33 - 5:46)** > > Yes, correct. But Al will have, I think, a positive effect on the GDP and economy. But whether it can do that, I don't know. I think right now, the biggest concern is whether people have seen so much value into Al that maybe it's overvalued a bit. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (5:47 - 6:20)** > > Certainly a valid argument. I recently had Bill Cohan on the show. He just wrote a really interesting book, Money to Burn. > > Did you read it? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > I have not read the book. I'm familiar with it. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Yeah, obviously, you're quite familiar with Apollo. One of the things after reading the book that scared me is they talked about a company called Athene, which Apollo owns in full. And I didn't realize the scale of annuities that they underwrite. You guys do that to a certain extent with your, I guess, it's \[Fortitude Re\] at Carlyle? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > Correct. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Is that a systemic risk? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (6:20 - 6:58)** > > I don't know if it's a systemic risk, but essentially for those who are listening, what happened is it was recognized by a number of people in the private equity world that annuities were a business where you gave a certain return to investors or people who bought policies. And you could probably earn a higher rate of return if you manage the money somewhat more aggressively than annuity firms typically did. And so Athene was started more or less by Apollo and other people have followed, doing something similar. Other firms are doing it. Time will tell whether it works out or not. Clearly, there's some risk associated with it. > > And now we're seeing some residue of the problems in some of the situations that have arisen. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (6:58** - **7:08)** > > To me, I see the two main risks are we're potentially in a private credit bubble, and two, bad underwriting. Are there any other risks that I'm not really seeing? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (7:08** - **7:54)** > > For the annuity holders, they always have the risk that if the investments aren't so great, maybe the annuity can't be honored, but that hasn't yet turned out to be the case. But essentially for those who are listening, what you're doing is taking things that instead of investing things that are going to get you a four or five or six percent annualized rate of return, you're doing things going to get you a 15 percent annualized rate of return. When you do that, you have higher risks. > > And therefore, sometimes it doesn't always work out. And one of the reasons we don't really know whether there's a big risk or not is that we haven't had a recession since this whole phenomenon has started. We usually have a recession in the United States on average every seven years. > > We haven't had a real recession for about 10 yea rs or so. So if we were to go into a recession, all fixed income would probably suffer a bit and annuities might as well. We don't know. > > But right now, it's not in the systemic risk. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (7:55** - **8:00)** > > And Carlyle doesn't own the whole insurance company. It's a minority, 10 percent or so of it. Was that done deliberately? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (8:01** - **8:14)** > > Well, no, it's not deliberately. The situation was, it costs a lot of money to buy these things. And at the time that we did it, we did it in a piecemeal way and bought a position in a company that helped create it. But we only own a minority piece of it. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (8:15** - **8:50)** > > And transitioning away, another thing that you bought is, a few years ago, you bought the Baltimore Orioles, which is extremely cool. Congratulations on that. And you have a great book, Inside the Owner's Box, which you can buy anywhere. I highly recommend it for anyone interested in the business of sports. In it, you interview Bob Kraft, who is amazing. One thing he said that struck me, he said, "I'll never sell the Patriots." At these prices, the Lakers just went for $12.5 billion. The Yankees just went for a similar amount. Even for the wealthiest of the wealthy, in terms of liquidity, is "never" too strong of a word? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (8:51** - **9:40)** > > Well, first of all, in Bob Kraft's case, I know him pretty well. And he does not want to sell the team. It's going to be part of his family for a long time. > > Secondly, if you were to sell a team like that, you'd have enormous capital gains tax, which I think a lot of people probably wouldn't want to pay. But third, I think that Bob did, in his case, it's publicly known now, did sell a piece of the team to two investors at an evaluation, I thought it was roughly $8.5 billion, something like that. So NFL owners who have these very high valuations now, or NBA owners have high valuations on their teams, well, they're sometimes selling minority stakes. And I should say my own firm, Carlyle, bought a minority stake not long ago in the Seattle Sea hawks. > > And the valuation, I think, was $9.6 billion. These are not inexpensive investments. But generally, we think that we'll do well with them. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (9:41** - **10:01)** > > Yeah, the minority stakes puzzle me. Jerry Tsai in your book... > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > Joe Tsai. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > \[Jerry Tsai\] was a different financial guy back in the '60s. \[Joe Tsai\] said it's basically a very expensive season ticket holder in some cases. > > When you bought the Orioles, how did you convince smart people like Grant Hill, I believe Bill Miller, to go along for the ride? What rights did you give them? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (10:02** - **10:35)** > > We give them information about what's going on. But remember, a lot of people don't want to take the time and effort to manage a team. I just came a minute ago from a couple of hour meeting with our head of baseball operations, head of our business operations. > > And it takes time to do it. Some people say, I'd like to own a team, have a stake in it. I think the values are going to go up. > > I'd like to go and watch the game and say I own it, but I don't want to manage it. So a lot of people have this position now. And there's a certain phenomenon now of people wanting to own a minority stake in a team, even if it's small, just because they feel they have some pride in how a team is performing. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (10:36** - **10:54)** > > But in terms of private equity, where generally the business model is buying an undervalued asset, improve it, probably potentially put some debt on and then sell it in four or five years, it doesn't seem like a typical, except for the assets have increased in value, a typical private equity playbook. Why is PE getting involved? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (10:54** - **11:53)** > > Private equity firms generally like to go where they think values are increasing or can be increased. And private equity firms were not allowed until recently to own any NFL teams. Certain private equity firms have been allowed to buy up to 10% with no ownership control rights. > > We think at Carlyle that the values of these franchises are going to go up. I wish I had thought this way before, when Josh Harris bought the Washington Commanders at a $6 billion valuation. I told him I thought it was very high, and I turned down the chance to invest at a $6 billion valuation. > > The team is probably worth double that today based on other things that are going on in professional sports. So I made a mistake, which I often do. But I think the people who are in private equity think that the values will continue to increase. > > The NFL teams are all very, very valuable because they have so much fan support in terms of watching on TV. So many of the most watched television programs in the country this year are NFL teams. And now the NFL is expanding outside the United States as well in terms of playing games and so forth. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (11:54 - 12:08)** > > You said in your book, and I thought this was extremely interesting, the Duke Blue Devils, for example, which is your alma mater, and the ACC, those eventually could be sold, at least the stakes in the team. Is that a realistic possibility? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (12:09 - 13:09)** > > I don't know. I'm not negotiating that now with anybody, but I would say that, as you know, a bill has passed the Senate that would reform, or at least that's the word that their sponsors use, college sports. It hasn't passed the House yet, and it may not pass it this year. > > But I think that there's going to be some reform in college sports because right now, you have a very, very complicated situation with the NIL and the portal and so forth. It's much different than when I was in college or you were in college. Then athletes didn't get paid anything and they really couldn't transfer so readily. It's a much different situation. > > So who is to say that five years from today somebody won't be able to buy a college football team or college basketball team or at least have a minority stake in it? I think it can happen. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Would it be fun to own the Devils? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > It'd be fun to be associated with the Blue Devils for sure, because I went there and it's a good program, and Jon Scheyer has done a spectacular job following the spectacular job that Mike Krzyzewski did. So sure, I think a lot of Duke fans would like to own a piece of the Duke Blue Devils, but I don't think that's going to happen in the immediate future. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (13:09 - 13:25)** > > Do you think that would potentially dilute the value of other professional sports stakes, because part of the thesis is there's only 30 NBA teams that you could buy, 30 baseball teams or 32 or whatever it is. Could that actually have an adverse impact? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (13:25 - 13:50)** > > I can't predict that far in advance. And of course, what I'm talking about hasn't happened yet, so it's hard to know, but there are only a limited number of college teams and college sports. We're likely to see a lot of people buying stakes in them. > > So Alabama in football, Texas in football, Ohio State in football, Michigan in football, Duke in basketball, UNC in basketball. There'd be a limited number of teams that probably you could get a lot of money around, but it's hard to predict. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (13:51 - 13:57)** > > I wanted to now talk about your book Speaking of America, which I loved. You started this speaker series. Why did you do it? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (13:58 - 15:04)** > > A number of years ago, I got involved with the Library of Congress, which is funded principally by the federal government. And I became a donor to them. They do take charitable contributions. > > And one of the things I thought I could do to help the Library of Congress was to bring together members of both parties in a dinner that I would host. So it wouldn't cost the government anything. We'd have a cocktail party. > > Members can talk to each other. And then we'd have a dinner. And then after the dinner, I would interview a great American historian about America. > > So David McCullough, Doris Kearns Goodwin, people like that. And I've also interviewed other people, not just historians. And the members like it because they tend to sit with people in the opposite party in the opposite house. > > And in the very divisive situation we have in Washington now, you don't see a lot of Democrats and Republicans socializing in a very visible way. And I thought that if they could get to know each other better, it'd be good. > > There's no press there. So nobody can see a Democrat is sitting with a Republican or somebody from the House is sitting with somebody from the Senate. > > And so the members like it, they learn about American history from a great scholar. And they can get to know their members of the opposite party better. So that's what I've done. > > I've done it now for more than 10 years. I took some of the best of those interviews and put them in a book that you're referring to. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (15:05 - 15:14)** > > As I said, I highly recommend it. And it's a wide variety of people who are interviewed, which I found interesting. Where did the speaker series take place? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (15:14 - 15:48)** > > It takes place in, it's just called, the Great Hall of the Library of Congress. The Library of Congress in Washington has three big buildings. The original one built in the 1890s is called the Jefferson Building. > > Jefferson sold his library collection to the Library of Congress. After the War of 1812, the Library of Congress's books were burned by the British when they invaded the Capitol. So Jefferson sold his collection to the Library. > > And some of it's still there. And the first building that was built in the late 1890s is called the Jefferson Building. And they have the most magnificent, I think, most beautiful setting in Washington, D.C., is called the Great Hall in the Library of Congress. And that's where we do the dinners. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (15:49 - 16:10)** > > Before we continue, if you're enjoying this conversation, I'd encourage you to subscribe to our Substack at boyarresearch.substack.com. That's where we share some of our research, all of our interviews, and our thoughts on investing. Now back to the conversation. > > Do you purposely put Democrats and Republicans next to each other, or they sit wherever they want? > > **\[DavidRubenstein\](16:11-17:20)** > > There are people that have place settings. Somebody does it where they put people together, but they can sit where they want, if they don't want to sit where they might be having an opportunity to sit. But generally, members tend to like to sit with people in the opposite party, because they don't know them as well. > > And in the old days, there was a lot of legislation. And when you have legislation passed the House, passed the Senate, you have a conference committee to work out the differences. But there's hardly any legislation anymore. > > All the legislation is pretty much negotiated at the leadership level. And as a result, you don't have a lot of conference committees. And as a result, members in the House, members in the Senate don't really know each other very well. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Is it the same people who come each time? > >   > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > A lot of people say they won't miss it. Some people say it's one of the most interesting things they're doing at Congress. > > There are a lot of regulars, but there are a lot of people that come a couple times. And because the schedule is always complicated, if you're a member of Congress, we have to do these between Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, because they're generally not there Mondays and Fridays. So on Tuesdays, Wednesday and Thursday, they have lots of competing things they can do. > > But we do get a fair number of people. And I would say about 250 people come each time. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > And is it roughly evenly split Democrat Republican? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > I really haven't looked at that. I don't know. Probably reflects the Congress, I suspect, which is slightly more Republican than Democratic at this point. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (17:21 - 17:33)** > > You talked about how one of the reasons you're doing this is to cure the divisiveness in Washington. Do you think the primary system is one of the culprits of that, divisiveness, just in terms of you get extremes on both parties or not really? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (17:34 - 18:22)** > > Maybe it's a factor, but the biggest factor is obviously money. Money is a gigantic factor. There's no limits any longer, essentially, on how much money one can give or how much money one can accept, because of all the different rules have been changed. > > And as a result, members of Congress tend to spend a lot of time raising money. Generally, the person who has the most money wins, not always, but generally. And therefore, members of Congress who like the job of being a member of Congress spend an enormous amount of time raising money. > > And you raise money from the far left or the far right. You don't raise money by saying, I'm going to go to Washington. I'll assess what makes the most sense each time. > > Sometimes I'll be on the liberal side. Sometimes I'll be on the conservative side. That doesn't raise any money. > > What raises money is saying, I'm going to do something in the far left or far right. That's honestly what members of Congress recognize. And so that tends to produce a certain divisiveness that doesn't produce a lot of bipartisanship in my view. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (18:22 - 18:26)** > > And that was primarily, I guess, Citizens United, was the main reason for this? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (18:27 - 19:16)** > > Well, the Citizens United was one case. That particular case was the one that allowed corporations to make a federal political contribution that hadn't been allowed before. But there's other cases that have happened recently, like there was a case the Supreme Court decided recently, which I think essentially said super PACs, they don't have a lot of constraints on what they could do with the money that they raise. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Do you ever see that going away? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > Never is a long time. > > I personally don't make political contributions. I've concluded that it's just not something for me. I don't make them at all. > > But more and more people do make political contributions for whatever reason. And they think there's a benefit to it. But I think more likely than not, people are going to start giving it even more money, because clearly there's some benefits to giving money, I suspect. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Well, benefits to them, not necessarily the country. > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > However you're looking at it, most people think that when they give money, they're doing it for a purpose that benefits the country. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (19:16 - 19:29)** > > Yeah. In the book, John F. Kennedy runs throughout. He gets probably more attention than any person out there. You have a chapter on the 1960 race, the Cuban Missile Crisis, his presidency. Was that done on purpose? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (19:30 - 20:30)** > > I wouldn't say it's on purpose, but I came of age really admiring President Kennedy. I was the chair for 14 years of the Kennedy Center. > > I've been one of the larger donors to the Kennedy School at Harvard, and I'm a donor as well to the Kennedy Library in Boston. So I came of age admiring him, admiring many of the things he did. And so maybe that's a factor. > > But also people have written more books about Kennedy than probably almost any other president, other than Lincoln or Washington. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > What do you think that is, especially since he only served, unfortunately, three years? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > One, he was tragically killed at the age of 46. > > So people remember that terrible tragedy. Secondly, he was young. He was charismatic. > > He was handsome. He had a beautiful wife. He had lovely young children, all those kinds of things, I think, made him a person that people wanted to write books about. And people write books about subjects that people want to buy books about. So these books sell. > > There's a lot of books out on John Kennedy. On any given week, there's a new book about John Kennedy. So my interviews probably reflect the number of books that are put out by him, but also my own interest in him. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (20:30 - 20:46)** > > One of his defining and shining moments happened 64 years ago this month, I guess, the Cuban Missile Crisis. And you give a fantastic retelling of it in the book. Do you think people realize how close we came to the end ? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (20:46 - 21:33)** > > No. First of all, it's pointed out in the interviews and other things that a Russian submarine commander had the right to launch a nuclear weapon from a submarine off the coast of the United States. We didn't know that at the time. And it was a two-to-one vote. There were three officers on the boat, and two to one, they voted not to launch a nuclear weapon. Had they voted two to one to launch a nuclear weapon, that would have been a tragedy. > > Secondly, what we didn't know at the time as well is that when the Russians pulled their nuclear missiles out of Cuba, they left behind an enormous number of tactical nuclear weapons, which at the time we didn't know they had. > > We didn't find out about it until Khrushchev ultimately removed them because he didn't trust Castro with them. But we didn't know when the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved. Everybody thought it was safe. > > We didn't realize there were still tactical nuclear weapons there. So now we know all that. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] {21:34 - 21:44)** > > One of the things that I didn't know is Kennedy taped the deliberations he had internally on what to do, how to respond to Khrushchev. Have you listened to the tapes? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > I have listened to the tapes. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] {21:45 - 22:41)** > > What did you think? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > I think you see a very deliberate person. John Kennedy was only 44 years old at the time, very young. > > He brought around him a group of very senior people, including people used to serve in government. And I think they made the right decision, which is to have a quarantine, and basically the Russians stopped delivering nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, and eventually removed the nuclear weapons, at least the strategic nuclear weapons, from Cuba, not the tactical ones. At the time, we didn't know. This is a very interesting phenomenon. > > At the time, we had a secret deal with the Soviet Union that we would remove our Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Now, we had a secret deal, interestingly, with the Russians. They weren't supposed to tell anybody that we were going to remove them. > > And so we had a deal with the Russians, and we didn't tell the American people, which is unusual. And Bobby Kennedy, I think, objected to that. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Was it him? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > Well, he was an intermediary, and I think he may not have supported that particular thing, but President Kennedy thought it made the most sense. And we did remove those missiles. And to be honest, they were somewhat antiquated, so it wasn't that big a gift. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] {22:42 - 22:47)** > > Are there any lasting lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis, or have we kind of forgotten it? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (22:47 - 23:44)** > > No, I think it's seen widely as one of the best examples of presidential decision-making in, let's say, the 20th century, where the president got senior people around him. He listened to all the debates. He resisted what the military wanted to do, which was to bomb. > > And he basically did a peaceful resolution to it, and it worked. At the time, we didn't know whether it would work or not, but Khrushchev ultimately decided to withdraw all their missiles and not deliver any more missiles. Though, obviously, the tactical ones still stayed there, and we didn't know that at the time. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > You were alive during that time. What was it like? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > It was unusual because I remember distinctly I was in the ninth grade, I think it was, and my teacher said, "I'm not going to give you any homework tonight because I don't think we'll be here tomorrow." > > Yeah, well, geez, that's kind of scary. But we thought at the time that there would be nuclear weapons launched against the United States, and interestingly, you're too young to remember this. In those days, in preparing for these kind of things, they would have you go under your desk. > > You have a desk in school, and you'd go under it. Like, there's no radiation to worry about. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (23:44 - 23:51)** > > Yeah, my dad, who's a little bit older than you, told me that. I don't know what they thought that would help with, but I don't know. > > **\[DavidRubenstein\](23:51-23:57)** > > I mean, nuclear weapons had radiation. People knew it at the time. I don't know what crouching under the desk would do, but we practice a lot. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (23:58 - 24:17)** > > One of Kennedy's not-so-shining moments was the Bay of Pigs. What he did, which was interesting, was he said, "I take full responsibility," after the disaster happened, and his approval went up. Why don't more people do something like that where they take responsibility for things that go wrong? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (24:18 - 25:25)** > > It's an interesting phenomenon. Kennedy was young. He made a mistake in his view. He was basically following a plan that CIA had developed under Dwight Eisenhower, but he didn't give the air support that the rebels wanted to have. > > And as a result, the mission failed, and many people were killed, and many people were captured. Kennedy made a public speech afterwards saying, "It's my fault. I take the blame." His popularity went up. > > Maybe because he took the blame and people recognized that that was the right thing to do. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > It was 83%, right? I mean, unheard of popularity. > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > Since that time, many politicians have said I take the blame, hoping they'll have the same effect as Kennedy. But what they often do is they say, I take the blame, but it really wasn't my fault. Or I take the blame, but something happened that I couldn't have foreseen. > > So people want the benefit of saying I took the blame, I take the responsibility, but they don't quite really mean it because they then add on additional things. But Kennedy clearly was liked by the American people for doing that. Some people would say the high watermark of the administration was actually the Bay of Pigs because he showed constraint and by showing constraint and not sending in a lot of military troops, we actually made a wiser decision. > > That's what people would say. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (25:25 - 25:35)** > > Another person you had on is a fellow by the name of Arthur Brooks. I enjoyed that chapter as well. Can you tell everyone a little bit about Arthur Brooks and his musical prowess too? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (25:36 - 26:31)** > > Arthur Brooks grew up in an academic family. He dropped out of high school to become a professional French horn player. He fell in love with a woman from Spain who didn't speak any English. > > He followed her, became a performer of the French horn in the Spanish symphony in Barcelona. And eventually he married her, and he's still married to her. And eventually he got a college degree. > > Eventually he got a PhD and he became an academic at Syracuse University and became the head for 10 years at the American Enterprise Institute. And up until recently he's taught at Harvard at the Kennedy School and at the business school. Now he teaches at Vanderbilt. > > He's basically written a book about happiness and how you get happiness. And he describes happiness and what it all means. And he's written a book with Oprah Winfrey about happiness. > > So he's become the happiness expert. And when he was teaching at Harvard, it was one of the most popular courses at Harvard, which is the \[unclear\] course on happiness. So that's who Arthur Brooks is, a very smart, very dynamic author and raconteur and academic administrator. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (26:32 - 26:46)** > > One of the things he says, which I thought was interesting, is, in terms of money making you happy, once you get to the middle class, an incremental dollar doesn't make you much happier. A billionaire is no less happy than someone who is middle class. Is that true, you think? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (26:47 - 27:18)** > > Yes, I know a lot of tortured billionaires. People are not that happy. I mean, my mother never had any money. > > My father never had any money to speak of and they were reasonably happy people. So a lot of the happiest people on the face of the earth are people that don't have a lot of money and a lot of the saddest people on the face of the earth are the people that have staggering amounts of money. So money itself won't make you happy. Now, on a subsistence level, having enough not to have to worry about money is obviously an important factor. But how many people worth $10 billion, $20 billion, $30 billion, $40 billion are really all that happy? Not that many, probably. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (27:18 - 27:21)** > > Does happiness potentially make you more successful? Is there no correlation? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > Well, I don't know if it makes you more successful, but happiness enables you to avoid having to spend a lot of time with a psychiatrist or with doctors, perhaps. But look, happiness is elusive. > > Thomas Jefferson talked about it in the Declaration of Independence, the pursuit of happiness. But happiness is part of the most elusive thing in life. And you don't know exactly what's going to produce happiness for you or how long it will last. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (27:42 - 27:54)** > > One of the things he also said was he only worked at the American Enterprise Institute for 10 years because someone shouldn't run a nonprofit for 10 years. One, do you agree with that? And two, should corporations be the same in terms of leaders? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (27:55 - 28:30)** > > In the academic world, it's generally thought that if you're a university president, probably 10 years is a good time to kind of think about doing something else. If you go to 11 yea rs or 12 years, it doesn't make that much difference. But doing it, as some presidents have done, for 20 years may not be the optimal period of time. > > So I'd say in the corporate world, it's rare to see a public company CEO unless he's the founder or she's the founder be there for more than 10 years. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Jamie Dimon, I guess, is a notable exception. > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > He is a notable exception. Jamie is there for, geez, maybe 20 plus years now, but he is in a league by himself, the greatest banker that ever lived. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (28:31 - 28:32)** > > Do you think he should be Treasury Secretary? Would that be good for the country? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (28:32 - 28:55)** > > I think the country would do well to have Jamie as Treasury Secretary. But Jamie is publicly identified as a Democrat. So I don't think he's going to go into work in a Republican administration. > > At this point, I don't know that he wants to do it. He's now 69 or 70 years old. He may not want to do that anymore, but he's got a lot of energy. > > If a president he liked offered him the Secretary of the Treasury job, he might well do it. I can't speak for him, but he's a very, very impressive person, for sure. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (28:56 - 29:06)** > > Another person you had on the speaker series was Eric Schmidt from Google, as I mentioned earlier. He said something interesting, the 20 percent rule at Google. Can you just talk about that a little bit? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (29:06 - 29:58)** > > Yes, when he was at Google, he became the first CEO of Google when it was a startup. He had previously run a company called Novell, and he'd been at Sun Microsystems before that. The 20 percent rule at Google, I don't know if it still exists or not, but when he was there, you can spend 20 percent of your time on things that are not in your day-to-day area of responsibility. > > In other words, 20 percent of your time coming up with a new idea that might benefit the company down the road, 20 percent of your time with a project that's innovative and creative, but not necessarily yet in the sights of Google or something they want to do. And some of the 20 percent time projects did lead to some things that were pretty impressive. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Like Google Maps, right? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > Correct. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Anything else? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > I'm not sure of all the things they came out with that, but I think some of the things that they came up with, maybe autonomous vehicles may have come out of that, and then some of the other technical things that they did that I think were very helpful and came out of the 20 percent timing rule. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (29:59 - 30:22)** > > You'd mentioned earlier in the interview that a grand bargain is elusive for Social Security, et cetera, because of the divisiveness in the country. One of the things I've been thinking about a lot is we've had times where you had a congressman beat a senator or vice versa with a cane. You've had a vice president shoot a treasury secretary. Does it always feel like now is the worst time or do you think this is especially bad? > >   > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (30:22 - 30:49)** > > Well, the Civil War was a case where 65 members of Congress were beaten on the floor of the House or the Senate by other members of the House or Senate, when the country was split in two in a war, and we lost 700, 800,000 men and women in that. So that was unusual. > > I think today is not a perfectly good time. There's a lot of division in Washington, they say. Not exactly an era of good feelings. > > Maybe that'll change in the future. But right now it's very divisive, but it's not as bad as the Civil War. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (30:49 - 30:56)** > > The Civil War, obviously, is a notable exception. But have there been other periods where you think the temperature in the country was too high? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (30:56 - 31:55)** > > I think during World War 11, right before World War **11,** the country was very divided about whether we should get into the war in Europe or not. And there were many people leading the effort to keep us out of the war. And that was a very divisive time right before World War 11. > > The same was true right before World War I. And I'd say during the Vietnam War, we had a terrible set of splits between people who supported the war and people who didn't support the war. So that was a much different time, much worse than anything we have now. > > **\[JonathanBoyar\]** > > Besides your speaker series, are there any prescriptions to kind of cool down the temperature? > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > lfwe could ever have constraints on fundraising, that would be good. But that's not realistic, because fundraising and giving money \[is seen\] as the right to exercise one's First Amendment rights. I think it takes leadership. > > If you have leaders that want to be more bipartisan, that can be helpful. And if you have leaders that are not worried about getting reelected, that can be helpful. > > But if I had the answers, I would be in New Hampshire or Iowa or South Carolina. I don't really have the answers. I don't know that any one person has the answers, but clearly it'd be better if we could do something to eliminate the divisiveness. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (31:55 - 32:04)** > > Last question. What have you learned most from the speaker series? And also, what have you learned that surprised you from owning a professional baseball team? > > **\[David Rubenstein\] (32:05 - 32:43)** > > On the speaker series, I've learned how members of Congress would like to be more bipartisan, but they have a lot of constraints to do so. It's very difficult given the atmosphere that we operate in. Members of Congress recognize the problems with the way our government operates, but they don't think they can do much about it. In terms of the Orioles, what I've learned is that it's not easy to win a championship and there are 30 tea ms each year that are trying to win a championship. > > And your odds are one out of 30, best case. So maybe even worse than that. In some cases, some teams have some advantages over you, but it's an enjoyable thing to do, but it's not for the people who can't stand criticism. > > If you don't like getting criticized, don't buy a sports team. > > **\[Jonathan Boyar\] (32:44 - 33:17)** > > Well, David, I want to thank you for your time, coming back to The World According to Boyar. It was a lot of fun, as always. > > **\[David Rubenstein\]** > > Thank you very much. I enjoyed it. > > **\[Disclaimer\]** > > Provided by Boyar's Intrinsic Value Research, for general informational purposes only, and should not be construed as investment advice. Any opinions expressed herein represent current opinions of Boyar Research only. > > Boyar Research assumes no obligation to update or revise such information. Investing in securities involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Past performance does not guarantee future results. > > Employees of Boyar Research or clients of an affiliate may own shares in any company discussed.   **Disclosure:** This podcast is for informational and educational purposes only and should not be considered investment advice, a recommendation to buy or sell any security, or an offer to provide investment advisory services. The views expressed by guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Boyar Research or its affiliates. Boyar Research, its affiliates, employees, and accounts managed by its affiliates may own shares of companies mentioned in this episode. Our views are subject to change at any time, and we are under no obligation to update listeners if our opinions or positions change. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Listeners should do their own research and consult with their own financial, tax, or legal advisors before making any investment decisions. **The Boyar Value Group: Uncovering Investment Opportunities Since 1975** Founded in 1975, The Boyar Value Group has spent more than five decades seeking to uncover undervalued opportunities in the stock market. Through Boyar Research, we provide in-depth, independent research focused on businesses we believe are misunderstood, underfollowed, or trading at a meaningful discount to intrinsic value. 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All rights reserved. | [Terms of Use & Legal Information](https://boyarvaluegroup-4595129.hs-sites.com/terms-of-use-legal-information) ```json { "@context" : "https://schema.org", "@type" : "BlogPosting", "dateModified" : "2024-10-01", "datePublished" : "2024-10-01", "headline" : "David Rubenstein: Owning the Orioles, Private Equity's Insurance Bet, and the $40 Trillion Problem", "image" : [ "https://4595129.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/4595129/David%20M.%20Rubenstein_web%20thumbnail.png" ], "mainEntityOfPage" : { "@id" : "https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/boyar-value-group-blog/david-rubenstein-returns", "@type" : "WebPage" } } ``` ```json { "@context" : "https://schema.org", "@type" : "BlogPosting", "author" : { "@type" : "Person", "name" : "Jonathan Boyar", "url" : "https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/boyar-value-group-blog/author/jonathan-boyar" }, "dateModified" : "2026-11-12T14:49:29.999Z", "datePublished" : "2026-11-12T14:37:28.000Z", "headline" : "David Rubenstein Returns: Owning the Orioles, Private Equity's Insurance Bet, and the $40 Trillion Problem", "image" : [ "https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/hubfs/David%20M.%20Rubenstein_web%20thumbnail.png" ], "mainEntityOfPage" : { "@id" : "https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/boyar-value-group-blog/david-rubenstein-returns", "@type" : "WebPage" }, "publisher" : { "@type" : "Organization", "logo" : { "@type" : "ImageObject", "url" : "https://www.blog.boyarvaluegroup.com/hubfs/Boyar_Logo_Value_Group-1.png" }, "name" : "Boyar Value Group" } } ```